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S NOTES

I

COMMONWEALTH V. AHEARN: PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY RULED INADMISSIBLE IN MURDER TRIAL
TO SHOW LACK OF DELIBERATION
AND PREMEDITATION
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held in Commonwealth
v. Ahearn1 that psychiatric testimony is inadmissible in a murder
trial to show a lack of deliberation and premeditation and thus prevent a verdict of murder in the first degree. The court's holding has
disregarded modern enlightened authority and unwisely restricted
the purpose for which psychiatric testimony may be admitted into
evidence. This Note will explore the implications of the court's
prior decisions concerning the admissibility of testimony in first
degree murder trials when such testimony is offered, not to absolve
the defendant of all guilt, but only for the limited purpose of
diminishing responsibility.
The defendant, Richard Ahearn, met the victim for the first
time in a Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, bar. After several hours of
drinking they decided to find a motel room and spend the evening
together. Failing in their attempt to secure a room, the victim suggested that the defendant drive to a secluded field outside of town.
When they arrived at the field they both removed their clothing.
Suddenly, and for some unknown reason, the defendant punched
the victim several times and pushed her out of the car. He pursued
her with a knife and proceeded to inflict ninety-seven stab wounds
upon various areas of her body. The defendant then dressed, but
he returned to the victim and proceeded to slash open her chest
from throat to abdomen. He then got into his car and drove his
automobile over her body several times.
The defendant pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him
with murder, and a non-jury trial was held to determine the degree
of guilt. At the trial, the defendant did not assert legal insanity
under the M'Naughten Rule. Instead, it-was argued that because
of his mental condition, he could not form an intent to kill, was
incapable of premeditating the murder, and consequently could
not be convicted of any crime higher than murder in the second degree. Two psychiatrists and one clinical psychologist testified for
1. 421 Pa. 311, 218 A.2d 561 (1966).
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the defense, and their analyses were substantially the same. It
was their opinion that the defendant's actions were motivated by a
deep-seated anxiety arising from repeated traumatic, pre-adolescent
sexual experiences. The repetitive character of those experiences
produced a conditioned reflex type of conduct which erupted when
triggered by specific stimuli, resulting in a mental state which
temporarily destroyed the defendant's ability to premeditate and
form a specific intent to kill. The Commonwealth presented no
psychiatric testimony in rebuttal. The trial judge ruled that the
expert's opinions were inadmissible, found the defendant guilty of
murder in the first degree, and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
From this judgment and sentence the defendant appealed.
The supreme court, in a four to three decision, affirmed the
determination of the lower court. The majority reasoned that the
defendant was really offering evidence of an irresistible impulse.
Since Pennsylvania has never accepted this doctrine as a supplement to M'Naughten,2 it was held that such testimony is also inadmissible in cases where it is offered to reduce the degree of guilt.
The dissenting opinions of Justices Cohen 3 and Roberts4 argued
that the psychiatric testimony was logically relevant and did not
violate the M'Naughten Rule. It was their opinion that the testimony should have been considered, the weight and ultimate finding being left to the trier of fact.
A proper analysis of this decision and the question involved
necessitates a brief review of the evolutionary history of psychiatric testimony and its use in the law. The genesis of the problem
presented in Ahearn was Daniel M'Naughten's Case. 5 Daniel
M'Naughten suffered from delusions of persecution, and he considered Robert Peel, Queen Victoria's Prime Minister, to be his
major persecutor. He attempted to assassinate Peel, but killed
Peel's secretary instead. M'Naughten was tried and found not
guilty by reason of insanity." The Queen's ire was raised by the
acquittal and the opinion was taken up by the House of Lords.
Fifteen judges of the common law courts were summoned into session. The opinion of the judges was written by Lord Chief Justice
Tindall and it announced the now famous M'Naughten Rule, or
right-wrong test.7 This test was almost universally adopted in
2. Commonwealth v. Tyrell, 405 Pa. 210, 174 A.2d 852 (1961); Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960).
3. 421 Pa. at 326, 218 A.2d at 569 (1966) (dissent).
4. Id. at 331, 218 A.2d at 571 (dissent).
5. L.R. 8 H.L. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
6. GUTTMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, 403 (1952);
RAY, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY, 343 (Overholser ed. 1962).
7. Daniel M'Naughten Case, L.R. 8 H.L. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
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the United States' and was quickly recognized in Pennsylvania.9
The Pennsylvania courts typically define legal insanity as an "inability, from disease of the mind, to understand the nature and
quality of the act and to distinguish between right and wrong
....
"10 This statement of the rule has been reaffirmed many
times."' Only in New Hampshire was the rule rejected. 12 That
state adopted a test which was to be the forerunner of the Durham
Rule.
Shortly after the M'Naughten Rule was formulated, it was denounced by prominent psychiatrists as an absurd standard which
had been discredited by medical science." In an effort to enlighten
M'Naughten, the rule was supplemented in some states by the irresistible impulse test. 14 This also met with medical disapproval, 1
and the supplementary rule has never been followed in Pennsylvania when the defendant's insanity is asserted as a complete
defense.'
In 1954, the District of Columbia Circuit Court adopted a new
7
and controversial test of insanity in Durham v. United States.'
The test for legal insanity announced in Durham was simple: A
defendant is not criminally responsible "if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or mental defect."' 8 The advantages of
the Durham Rule were obvious, for now psychiatrists were permitted to provide all relevant medical information to the trier of
fact. Despite this advantage, however, the Durham Rule had its
deficiencies. The rule did not clearly define what standard the
fact finder was to use in judging the competency of the accused.' 9
Many of the objections to the Durham standard were accommodated by the American Law Institute in formulating section 4.01
8. See, United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966), where
there is a thorough discussion of the history surrounding the M'Naughten
decision.
9. Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264 (1846).
10. Commonwealth v. Neill, 362 Pa. 507, 514, 67 A.2d 276, 279 (1949).
11. Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960);
Commonwealth v. Heller, 369 Pa. 457, 87 A.2d 287 (1952).
12. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870).
13. See RAY, op. cit. supra note 6; Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an
Expert Witness, 22 U. CHi. L. REv. 325 (1955).
14. See Satten, Murder Without Apparent Motive, 117 AM. J. oF Psycs _TAY 48 (1960).

15. RAY, op. cit supra note 6, at 344; Satten, supra note 14.
16. Commonwealth v. Tyrell, 405 Pa. 210, 174 A.2d 852 (1961); Commonwealth v. Neill, 362 Pa. 507, 67 A.2d 276 (1949).
17. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
18. Id. at 874-75.
19. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 Y~AL. L.J. 761 (1956).
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of the Model Penal Code, which provides that:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at
the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law.
(2) The terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an
abnormality manifested only
by repeated criminal or
20
otherwise antisocial conduct.
The Second Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals has
recently adopted section 4.01 as the standard of criminal responsibility in that circuit.21 On July 1, 1965, the State of New York
rejected M'Naughten and adopted a test similar to the Model
Penal Code. 22 Similarly, Vermont now follows essentially the same
test as section 4.0 1,23 as does Connecticut 24 and Wisconsin. 2 The
Ahearn decision must be viewed in the light of these recent developments in this area of the law.
As legislation and judicial decisions proliferate, the criminal
law becomes increasingly more sophisticated and complex. All
through this evolutionary process, however, there remain fundamental questions which must be resolved. Commonwealth v.
Ahearn presents such a question. For over a century now the
courts have been concerned with the role of the psychiatrist in the
law. Long treated with distrust, the psychiatrist only recently
has found the courtroom to be a more inviting forum. Unfortunately, Ahearn does not reflect this modern trend. It is evident that the advances of modern psychiatry were of little significance to the majority, and their distrust of this branch of modern medicine was evident when the court stated that "the Courts of
Pennsylvania believe that the opinion of a psychiatrist . . . is entitled to little weight .... 21

It cannot be disputed that former decisions have consistently
shown a distrust for the opinion of the psychiatrist and have insisted that such opinions be given little weight. After reaffirming
this principle, however, the court went on to hold that such testimony is not to be admitted to show a lack of premeditation and
deliberation and thereby prohibit a verdict of murder in the first
degree. Furthermore, after announcing these two principles, the
§ 4.01 (final draft 1962).
United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
N.Y. PENAL LAW, § 1120.
23. VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 13, § 4801 (1957).
24. State v. Davies, 146 Conn. 137, 148 A.2d 251, cert. denied, 360 U.S.
921 (1959).
25. State v. Shoffner, 143 N.W.2d 458 (Wis. 1966).
26. 421 Pa. at 324, 218 A.2d at 568 (1966).
20.
21.
22.

MODEL PENAL CODE
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majority concluded by saying that "this has always been the law of
Pennsylvania."2 7 This is not a correct statement of the law as it
existed prior to Ahearn. While prior decisions have held that
neither judge nor jury is to be controlled by psychiatric testimony,
and that such testimony is to be accorded little weight, no prior
Pennsylvania case has ever held that such testimony is inadmissible to show a lack of the elements necessary to establish murder
in the first degree. For this reason, Ahearn represents a new development in the law of Pennsylvania.
In several of the cases cited by the majority on the question of
admissibility, the lower court had permitted a psychiatrist to give
his expert opinion as to the defendant's state of mind.28 In each of
these cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court merely questioned
the weight to be given such evidence and did not rule that the evidence was inadmissible.
In Commonwealth v. Elliott,2 9 a case relied upon by the ma-

jority, the defendant pleaded guilty to killing a police officer during the course of an armed robbery. The defense introduced psychiatric testimony to show that the defendant was a mental defective. This evidence was admitted in order to aid the court in imposing sentence, and the testimony was not offered for the purpose
of diminishing responsibility nor to absolve the defendant of guilt.
Guilt was admitted, and, since this was a killing committed in the
perpetration of a felony, the degree of guilt was already fixed by
statute as first degree murder.3 0 Since this case is factually distinguishable, it cannot be authority for excluding the psychiatric testimony offered in the trial of Richard Ahearn.
31
The majority relied heavily upon Commonwealth v. Carroll.
The facts in this case were almost identical to those in Ahearn.
Upon appeal from a conviction of first degree murder, counsel for
the defendant contended that the court must be controlled by the
testimony of the psychiatrist and that the testimony of the defendant's psychiatrist required the lower court to fix the degree of
guilt at no higher than murder in the second degree. The psychiatrist had testified that the defendant was mentally ill and incapable
27. Ibid.
28. See Commonwealth v. Carroll, 412 Pa. 525, 194 A.2d 911 (1963);
Commonwealth v. Jorden, 407 Pa. 575, 181 A.2d 310 (1962); Commonwealth
v. Tyrell, 405 Pa. 210, 174 A.2d 852 (1961); Commonwealth v. Neill, 362 Pa.
507, 67 A.2d 276 (1949); Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d
98 (1960).
29. 371 Pa. 70, 89 A.2d 782 (1952).
30. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4701 (1963) provides as follows: "[All
murder ... which shall be committed in the perpetration of .
ro-I..
bery . . .shall be murder in the first degree."
31. 412 Pa. 525, 194 A.2d 911 (1963).
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of deliberation and could not form a specific intent to kill. The
trial court admitted the testimony but chose to disregard it in
reaching a verdict. Affirming the trial court, the supreme court
said:
The rule regarding the weight of expert testimony in
this class of case is well settled. "[E]xpert testimony is
entitled to little weight as against positive facts. Expert
medical opinions are especially entitled to little or no
weight when based upon insufficient or (partly) erroneous
facts or a feigned state of mind or an inaccurate past history, or upon unreasonable deductions ... .
This decision also is not precedent for the ruling in Ahearn. At the
trial, defendant's psychiatrist was permitted to testify that the defendant was incapable of premeditating. The admissibility of this
evidence was not questioned by the appellate court. The question
resolved in Carroll concerned the weight, not the admissibility of
psychiatric testimony.
It was also held by the majority that the statute popularly
known as the Split Verdict Act 33 compelled the exclusion of the
psychiatric testimony offered in the Ahearn trial3 4 It is hard to
imagine how this statute could require such a result. The statute
merely provides that the court may hear additional testimony in
order to aid the finder of fact in fixing the penalty. Nowhere in
the act is it implied that psychiatric testimony may be admissible
only to show insanity under the M'Naughten Rule and for the purpose of fixing the penalty, as was held by the court. The statute
provides that:
Whenever the jury shall agree upon a verdict of murder
of the first degree, they shall . . . render the same ...

After such verdict is recorded and before the jury is permitted to separate, the court shall proceed to receive such
additional evidence not previously received in the trial as
may be relevant and admissible upon the question of the
penalty to be imposed ....35
No mention is made in the statute of the admissibility of evidence to determine the degree of guilt. The statute speaks only of
evidence to be admitted after the degree of guilt is established, and
then only for the purpose of determining the penalty to be imposed.
It is submitted that the "additional evidence" which the legislature
contemplated when formulating this statute was evidence such as
convictions of prior crimes. The statute is not authority for excluding psychiatric testimony to determine the degree of guilt.
32. Id at 535, 194 A.2d at 916.
33. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4701 (1963).
34. 421 Pa. at 324, 218 A.2d at 568 (1966).
35. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4701 (1963).
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Indeed, in a first degree murder charge, the question to be resolved
is whether or not the defendant deliberated and premeditated his
act. Since this is the inquiry that the jury must make, the opinion
of a qualified expert concerning the condition of the defendant's
mind is most relevant. Certainly the legislature did not intend to
exclude such testimony and deprive the jury of this valuable expert
assistance. If the statute had so intended, then it would have
clearly said so.
Richard Ahearn's defense was that of diminished responsibility.
It was the defendant's contention that his mental illness, while not
amounting to insanity under the M'Naughten Rule, nevertheless
prevented him from possessing a mind capable of premeditating
and forming a specific intent to kill. The majority characterized
this defense as "irresistible impulse" and flatly rejected it. It appears that this is the major reason why the court ruled that the
defendant's psychiatric testimony was inadmissible. Under the
M'Naughten Rule Pennsylvania has consistently ruled that a psychiatrist may not testify as to the defendant's irresistible impulses. 36 These holdings, however, have been in cases where the
defendant sought to assert insanity as a complete defense and thus
avoid all criminal responsibility. While irresistible impulse will not
absolve one of all guilt in Pennsylvania, it has been held that evidence of defective mental condition is admissible for the purpose of
reducing the grade of the offense to second degree murder.3 7
Prior to Ahearn it has never been held that all psychiatric
testimony is inadmissible, except to show insanity as a complete
defense under M'Naughten or to aid the court in fixing the penalty.
The case of Commonwealth v. Woodhouse 3 is illustrative. In this
murder trial three psychiatrists testified that the defendant was
insane according to M'Naughten, and that the murder was the result of an irresistible impulse. The jury disregarded the testimony
of the psychiatrists and returned a verdict of murder in the first
degree. Upon appeal, the defendant contended that M'Naughten
should be abandoned and replaced by the irresistible impulse test.
The decision was affirmed, and the court ruled that the irresistible
impulse test would not be accepted to supplement or supplant
M'Naughten. The court did not rule, however, that this test
36. Commonwealth v. Tyrell, 405 Pa. 210, 174 A.2d 852 (1961); Commonwealth v. Neill, 362 Pa. 507, 67 A.2d 276 (1949).
Accord, Common37. Jones v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa. 403 (1874).
wealth v. Werling, 164 Pa. 559, 30 Ati. 406 (1894) (dictum); Commonwealth v. Hillman, 189 Pa. 548, 42 Atl. 196 (1899). Contra, Commonwealth
v. Tyrell, 405 Pa. 210, 174 A.2d 852 (1961), where there is a dictum to the
contrary which is unsupported by authority.
38. 401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960).
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could not reduce a verdict from murder in the first to murder in the
second degree. In fact, the court did not question the admissibility of the psychiatric testimony, for it approved the following
portion of the trial judge's charge: "In addition thereto, you will
consider the opinions of the psychiatrists. You must consider
their training, qualifications and experience, and the date or
dates when they examined the defendant."39 The evidence which
the trial court was commenting upon in this charge was that presented by the defendant which tended to show that his actions were
the result of an irresistible impulse. Only the weight and use of
this testimony was questioned by the supreme court, not its admissibility.
There is general agreement in both the medical and legal professions that irresistible impulse is not a satisfactory supplement to
the M'Naughten Rule.40 Nevertheless, when the Commonwealth
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's state of
mind was such that he had a specific intent to take life and that
the murder was deliberate and premeditated, it would seem that if
the defendant's actions were the result of an irresistible impulse,
the Commonwealth has not proved its case. Therefore, the psychiatrist's testimony is very relevant on this issue, for the defendant's state of mind is an indispensible element in establishing first
degree murder. Evidence which shows that, at the time of the killing, the defendant was incapable of premeditating should be admissible.
Even if it were the well settled law of Pennsylvania that an
irresistible impulse will not reduce the degree of guilt in homicide
cases, it is submitted that Ahearn is too broad. The court has not
merely restricted testimony of an irresistible impulse when it is
offered to diminish responsibility; the decision holds that all psychiatric testimony is inadmissible in determining guilt except under
the M'Naughten Rule. In effect, the psychiatrist is now permitted
to make but one statement: Either the defendant did or did not
know the difference between right and wrong. All other psychiatric testimony is excluded. Only after both guilt and degree have
been established will additional psychiatric testimony be heard, and
then only to aid the court in fixing the penalty.
It is possible that in'some cases the defendant's actions will not
be the result of what the medical profession terms an irresistible
impulse. Yet, the defendant's act may be the result of a mental dis39. Id. at 259, 164 A.2d at 107.
40. Commonwealth v. Tyrell, 405 Pa. 210, 174 A.2d 852 (1961); Commonwealth v. Barner, 199 Pa. 335, 49 Atl. 60 (1901); RAY, op. cit. supra,
note 6, at 344.
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order of such nature as to prevent him from premeditating and
forming a specific intent to kill. In this situation the requirements
of the statute defining first degree murder are not present, but the
Ahearn decision prevents the defendant from raising this legitimate defense. If the testimony of the medical expert is inadmissible, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the defense to meet
the Commonwealth's burden of proof and establish second degree
murder as the proper statutory degree of guilt.
It is also interesting to observe that the majority has apparently
decided that they, not the psychiatrist, are better qualified to
determine the mental capacity of one accused of murder. The
import of the decision is that any defendant accused of murder
either did not know the difference between right and wrong, or,
did know right from wrong but had no mental impairment which
prevented him from deliberating and premeditating the killing of
which he is accused. It is submitted that there is no justification
for this position. There is no law which presumes to tell the medical
profession what is pregnancy or appendicitis. In such cases the
doctor's diagnosis is accepted, and no court would challenge the doctor's conclusion by confronting him with a legal definition of appendicitis or pregnancy. Nevertheless, the majority has chosen to
make its own diagnosis of a defendant of questionable sanity who
is accused of murder and turn this diagnosis into a legal rule.
As early as 1846, Pennsylvania, while following M'Naughten,
recognized that even though one knows the difference between
right and wrong, one may yet be too insane to premeditate murder
4
and form a specific intent to kill. In Commonwealth v. Mosler '
Chief Justice Gibson stated:
A man may be mad on all subjects; and then, though he
may have glimmerings of reason, he is not a responsible
agent.

This is general insanity ....

But there is moral or

homicidal insanity consisting of an irresistible inclination
to kill, or to commit some other particular offense. There
may be an unseen ligament pressing on the mind, drawing
it to consequences which it sees, but cannot avoid, and placing it under a coercion which, while42 its results are clearly
perceived, is incapable of resistance.
This statement by Chief Justice Gibson received approving
comment in Coyle v. Commonwealth.4 The first recognition of
this form of mental disorder as a partial defense in cases of felonious homicide, however, was in Jones v. Commonwealth.44 In this
41.
42.
43.
44.

4 Pa. 264 (1846).
Id. at 266-67. (Emphasis added.)
100 Pa. 573 (1882).
75 Pa. 403 (1874).
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case Justice Agnew stated:

Want of intelligence..,

is not the only defect to mod-

erate the degree of the offense; but with intelligence there
may be an absence of power to determine properly the true
nature and character of the act, its effect upon the subject,
and the true responsibility of the act; a power necessary to
control the impulses of the mind and prevent the execution
of the thought which possesses it. In other words, it is the
absence of that self-determining power which, in a sane
mind, renders it conscious of the real nature of its own purposes, and capable of resisting wrong impulses. When
this self-governing power is wanting, whether it is caused
by insanity, gross intoxication or other controlling influence, it cannot be said truthfully that the mind is fully conscious of its own purposes, and deliberates or premeditates
in the
sense of the act describing murder in the first de4
gree. 5
Two years later, in Green v. Commonwealth 46 Chief Justice
Agnew made his position absolutely clear:
So far as impetuous rage and rashness followed by the
immediate act which takes away life, tend to deprive the
prisoner of deliberation and premeditation, and to reduce
the homicide from murder in the first to murder in the second degree. .

.

. a jury may be convinced that it was not

the result of a fully formed purpose to kill, but of a rash and
hasty impulse, with scarcely a consciousness of any purpose.
. . . Hence, though the absence of a legal provocation may

prevent the reduction of the crime from murder to manslaughter, the want of the deliberation and premeditation
required by the law may reduce the
grade of the murder
47
from the first to the second degree.
The majority decision in Ahearn fails to distinguish between
a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused and a
trial to determine the degree of guilt. Though the doctrine of irresistible impulse has never been accepted in Pennsylvania as a
substitute for or supplement to the M'Naughten Rule, 48 this does
not mean that evidence of an irresistible impulse is totally inadmissible in all instances. It should be admissible in murder trials
for the purpose of establishing the degree of guilt. It is submitted
that the correct rule to be followed in cases such as Ahearn was
announced by the Supreme Court of California in People v. Gorshen,49 where the court said:
[0] n the trial of the issues raised by a plea of not
45. Id. at 408. (Emphasis added.)
46. 83 Pa. 75 (1876) (dictum).
47. Id. at 79. (Emphasis added.) (dictum).
48. Commonwealth v. Tyrell, 405 Pa. 210, 174 A.2d 852 (1961); Commonwealth v. Neill, 362 Pa. 507, 67 A.2d 276 (1949).
49. 51 Cal.2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959).
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guilty to a charge of a crime which requires proof of a specific mental state, competent evidence that because of mental abnormality not amounting to legal insanity defendant
did not possess the essential specific mental state is admissible. The admission of testimony . . . of the expert . . .
for . . . consideration by the trier of fact upon issues of
particular essential mental state, does not . . . imply ac-

ceptance (on the general issue) of the defense of irresistible impulse (which is rejected in this state as a test of
the defense of legal insanity) ....
[I] rresistible impulse does not constitute the insanity
which is a complete defense; i.e., which is exculpatory of all
penal responsibility for any otherwise criminal act. So
considered, [however, such]

statements . . . do not pre-

clude the admission and consideration, on the issue of specific intent or other particular mental state, of expert testimony which includes such concepts as the uncontrollable
compulsion described by the expert here ...
Such expert evidence, like evidence of unconsciousness
resulting from voluntary intoxication is received not as a
'complete defense' negating capacity to commit any crime
but as a 'partial defense' negating specific mental state
essential to a particularcrime. 50
Deliberation and premeditation are essential elements of a
charge of first degree murder under most statutes in the United
States. These elements must be affirmatively proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. Since both these elements involve the defendant's state of mind, their existence cannot be
proved by any objective test. Therefore, any evidence tending to
show the absence of either element is relevant and must be considered by the trier of fact in reaching a decision. Accordingly, the
rule of the Gorshen case is followed in many jurisdictions.5 ' Thus
50. Id. at 726-27, 336 P.2d at 498-99. (Emphasis added.) In a later California case, People v. Henderson, 60 Cal.2d 482, 386 P.2d 677 (1963), a
similar result was reached. In this case the facts were nearly identical
to Ahearn. The defendant had taken the victim to a motel room for the
purpose of having sexual relations with her and then, for some unknown
reason, strangled her and then mutilated her body. The defendant was
convicted of first degree murder and the supreme court reversed the conviction because the judge failed to instruct on the defense of diminished
responsibility. The court said that:
it can no longer be doubted that a defense of mental illness not
amounting to legal insanity is a 'significant issue' in any case in
which it is raised by substantial evidence. [I]f he was suffering
from a mental illness that prevented . . . premeditation and deliberation, he cannot be convicted of murder in the first degree.
See also, People v. Baker, 42 Cal.2d 550, 268 P.2d 705 (1954).
51. Battalino v. People, 118 Colo. 587, 199 P.2d 897 (1948); State v.
Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 126 N.W.2d 285 (1964); State v. DiPaolo, 34 N.J.
279, 168 A.2d 401 (1961).
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it has been held that evidence of feeblemindedness,12 provocation, 3
influence of drugs, 54 and passion induced by various causes55
should be admitted and weighed by the jury. It has also been
stated that bodily disease, 58 want of sleep and rest, 7 rash impulse,
headlong fury, sudden and overwhelming grief,58 sudden and uncontrollable emotion 59 and impetuous rage 60 are proper matters to
be considered by the jury in determining whether the required
elements of deliberation and premeditation have been proved.
The question of voluntary intoxication and its effect on a defendant's mental state has arisen more frequently. It has been
held in twenty states, including Pennsylvania,"' that this may prevent a killing from being deliberate and premeditated.62 If such a
defense is permitted to negate the elements of deliberation and premeditation in cases where the defendant is intoxicated, which condition is always voluntary, then it logically follows that there is a
more compelling reason to permit such testimony for the same purpose when, due to no fault of his own, the defendant's mental
state prevents him from being capable of committing premeditated
murder.
52. People v. Moran, 249 N.Y. 179, 163 N.E. 553 (1928) (Per Curiam);
accord, State v. Schilling, 95 N.J.L. 145 (Ct. Err. and App. 1920); contra,
Commonwealth v. Scott, 14 Pa. D. & C. 191 (Oyer & Terminer 1930).
53. People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2d 880, 156 P.2d 7 (1945).
54. State v. Close, 106 N.J.L. 321, 148 Atl. 764 (Ct. Err. & App. 1930);
State v. English, 164 N.C. 497, 80 S.E. 72 (1913).
55. Watson v. State, 82 Ala. 10, 2 So. 455 (1886); Anderson v. State,
43 Conn. 514 (1876) (passion produced by any cause); State v. Jackson, 344
Mo. 1055, 130 S.W.2d 595 (1939) (passion produced by insult); People v.
Caruso, 246 N.Y. 437, 159 N.E. 390 (1927); Winton v. State, 151 Tenn. 177,
268 S.W. 633 (1924).
56. State v. Close, 106 N.J.L. 321, 148 AtI. 764 (Ct. Err. & App. 1930).
57. Ibid.
58. People v. Moran, 249 N.Y. 179, 163 N.E. 553 (1928) (dissent).
59. People v. Barberi, 149 N.Y. 256, 43 N.E. 635 (1896).
60. Green v. Commonwealth, 83 Pa. 75 (1876).
61. Commonwealth v. McCausland, 348 Pa. 275, 35 A.2d 70 (1944);
Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353 (1940), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 862 (1949); Commonwealth v. Cleary, 135 Pa. 64, 19 Atl. 1017
(1890); Jones v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa. 403 (1874).
62. People v. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544 (1863); Brennan v. People, 37 Colo.
256, 86 Pac. 79 (1906); State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136 (1873); State v.
Kupis, 37 Del. 27, 179 Atl. 640 (1935); Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 9 So.
835 (1891); Aszman v. State, 123 Ind. 347, 24 N.E. 123 (1890); State v.
Wilson, 234 Iowa 60, 11 N.W.2d 737 (1943); Commonwealth v. Parsons, 195
Mass. 560, 81 N.E. 291 (1907); Maynard v. State, 81 Neb. 301, 116 N.W. 53
(1908); Wilson v. State, 60 N.J.L. 171, 37 Atl. 954 (Ct. Err. & App. 1897);
State v. Cooley, 19 N.M. 91, 140 Pac. 1111 (1914); People v. Leonardi, 143
N.Y. 360, 38 N.E. 372 (1894); State v. English, 164 N.C. 497, 80 S.E. 72
(1913); Long v. State, 109 Ohio St. 77, 141 N.E. 691 (1923); State v. Weaver,
35 Ore. 415, 58 Pac. 109 (1899); Jones v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa. 403 (1874);
Commonwealth v. McCausland, 348 Pa. 275, 35 A.2d 70 (1944); Pirtle v.
State, 9 Humph. 663 (Tenn. 1849); Willis v. Commonwealth, 32 Gratt 929
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Furthermore, it is the law in Pennsylvania that testimony concerning the mental incapacity of a defendant charged with murder,
even though short of insanity, is admissible as relevant to the determination of the penalty 83 Since the penalty is to fit the crime, it
would be indeed anomalous to refuse the same type of testimony
concerning the crime itself, particularly in murder trials where the
degree is determined before the penalty.
In still another situation Pennsylvania, as well as other states,
accepts evidence of an irresistible impulse and permits such evidence to diminish criminal responsibility. In the crime of vountary
manslaughter, like murder, the defendant has intentionally taken
the life of another. Voluntary manslaughter is an intentional killing
without malice.6 4 The classic example of such a killing is the socalled "crime of passion."' 5 It is submitted that in such cases the
defendant was motivated to kill the victim by an irresistible impulse. The impulsive act is not that of a rational individual, yet
it is not the action of one who is legally insane, temporarily or
permanently, under the M'Naughten Rule.
In Commonwealth v. Donough6 Mr. Chief Justice Bell, speaking for the court, described the state of mind which would reduce
criminal responsibility from murder to manslaughter. He said:
Voluntary manslaughter is a homicide intentionally
committed under the influence of passion ....

The term

'passion' as here used includes both anger and terror provided they reach a degree of intensity sufficient to obscure temporarily the reason of the person affected...
Passion, as used in a charge defining manslaughter ...
means any of the emotions of the mind known as anger,
rage, sudden resentment or terror, rendering the mind incapable of cool reflection....

Although 'anger' is the pas-

sion usually existing in cases of this class, yet any other
passion, as sudden resentment,.. . rendering the mind incapable of cool reflection, may reduce the grade of the
crime....
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The import of this description, though not synonomous, is like
the actions of one who is motivated by an irresistible impulse. If,
(Va. 1879); State v. Hertzog, 55 W. Va. 74, 46 S.E. 792 (1904); Sabens v.

United States, 40 D.C. App. 440 (1913).

Contra, State v. Dearing, 65 Mo.

530 (1877); State v. Tatro, 50 Vt. 483 (1877).
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1963); Commonwealth v. Ahearn,
421 Pa. 311, 218 A.2d 561 (1966).
64. Commonwealth v. Santos, 275 Pa. 515, 119 At. 596 (1923); Commonwealth v. Palermo, 368 Pa. 28, 81 A.2d 540 (1951); Commonwealth v.
Cargill, 357 Pa. 510, 55 A.2d 373 (1947).
65. Commonwealth v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343, 80 Ati. 571 (1911); Commonwealth v. Cargill, supra note 64.
66. 377 Pa. 46, 103 A.2d 694 (1954).
67. Id. at 52-53, 103 A.2d at 698 (Emphasis added.).
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in the opinion of the psychiatrist, Richard Ahearn's actions were not
coldblooded, but were the result of anger, rage, and sudden resentment sufficient to obscure temporarily his reason and render his
mind incapable of cool reflection, so as to reduce the grade of the
crime, 8 it should not matter whether such conduct is termed "passion" or "irresistible impulse." The testimony is relevant and
should be considered by the trier of fact. Since such a mental state
is sufficient to reduce the degree of guilt from murder to manslaughter,69 likewise, this same state of mind should be sufficient
to reduce the degree of guilt from murder in the first to murder
in the second degree. In both instances the essential fact to be
determined is the condition of the defendant's mind at the time of
the killing. It is inconsistent that testimony concerning the state
of the defendant's mind should be admitted in the one instance
and not in the other. This is especially true when it is considered
that in the crime of passion the testimony offered by the defendant
to show such passion is often the testimony of the defendant himself and lay witnesses, and not that of disinterested experts in the
field of psychiatry.
The defendant's psychiatric testimony cannot be rejected because it is unreliable, for such testimony is universally accepted to
determine whether legal insanity, which would completely negate
all criminal responsibility, exists.70 Such evidence is also
admitted
71
to aid the court in determining the penalty to be imposed.
The majority questioned the weight to be given the psychiatrist's opinion because such opinions are "based to a large extent
upon self-serving unsworn statements given . ..by the defendant
as to his prior life and prior thoughts, actions and reactions, as to
which there is no proof, no
opportunity of cross-examination and
'7 2
usually no corroboration.
It is not altogether clear whether this was a reason for ruling
that the testimony was inadmissible. If it was, it is completely inconsistent with the M'Naughten Rule. When insanity is asserted as
a complete defense, the psychiatrist's opinion is admissible and, if
believed, relieves the defendant of all criminal responsibility.
This opinion is based upon an analysis of unsworn self-serving
and uncorroborated statements of the accused, just like those which
78
Richard Ahearn made to his psychiatrist.
68. Ibid.
69. Commonwealth v. Palermo, 368 Pa. 28, 81 A.2d 540 (1951).
70. Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264 (1846).
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1963).
72. 421 Pa. at 323, 218 A.2d at 567.
73. The majority emphasized that the defendant's statements to the
psychiatrist were unsworn and not subject to cross-examination. It is
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To hold that psychiatric testimony is competent for the purpose of entirely relieving one of criminal responsibility but not
competent for the lesser purpose of negating the existence of willfulness, deliberation and premeditation is inconsistent and unjustified. While reasonable men may differ as to the weight accorded
to psychiatric testimony, it cannot reasonably be said that such
testimony is legally incompetent or legally irrelevant: the evidence
should be admitted and considered by the finder of fact.74 Furthermore, a recognition of the principle of diminished responsibility
does not do violence to the M'Naughten Rule, nor does it modify the
rule concerning the inadmissibility of an irresistible impulse when
it is asserted as a complete defense.
CONCLUSION

The genius of the common law lies in its ability to respond to
its surroundings; it adapts itself to changing times and reflects
submitted that this is not a sound reason for excluding the offered testimony. In the first instance, the defendant has the right not to testify. He
has the privilege of not having any of his statements subjected to crossexamination. Secondly, if he were to take the stand, he would not be
permitted to reveal to the trier of fact the statements which he made to
the psychiatrist, for such statements would be inadmissible. Neither judge
nor jury would be permitted to use this testimony to form an opinion con-

cerning the defendant's state of mind. This is a conclusion the law allows
only the expert to make.
74. When one considers the hideous details of Ahearn, even a layman
would doubt whether the defendant's actions were those of a mentally
competent individual. Although the trial judge ruled the evidence inadmissible, he noted that:
The acts of the defendant were so unusual-so bizzare-so
senseless-so completely devoid of motive-that the explanation of
the psychiatrists furnishes the only logical explanation. The court,
who is the fact finding body in this instance, has chosen to believe
the psychiatric explanation. We are therefore dealing with the
situation where the testimony of the psychiatrists is accepted at
face value and not where their testimony is swept under the rug
as unworthy of belief.
Opinion of Judge Campbell, Record, pp. 328-29, Commonwealth v. Ahearn,
421 Pa. 311, 218 A2.d 561 (1966). See also, Commonwealth v. Woodhouse,
401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960), a case involving a bizzare murder, where
Mr. Justice Musmanno said of the psychiatric testimony offered:
The evidence of doctors in a case of this kind is not 'low grade.'
They have studied and they have been trained to analyze mental
disorders. They have had many years of experience, they have
seen and analyzed hundreds of cases. They are certainly in a far
better position to diagnose a mental illness than a casual observer.
... [The facts of this case] should be enough to convince anyone
that the defendant was not in his right mind when he committed
the horrible deeds ....

The jury had the right to be assisted in

the discharge of their awesome duties by listening to doctors who
have dedicated their lives to determining the why and the wherefore of the inexplicable. 401 Pa. 261-62, 164 A.2d at 108-09
(dissent).
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modern thinking. At the time of M'Naughten's trial, psychiatry
was hardly a profession, let alone a science, and it was natural that
the common law should look upon psychiatric testimony with distrust. In the twentieth century, however, psychiatry has evolved
from a tentative, hesitant groping in the dark of human ignorance
to a recognized and important branch of modern medicine. The
fact that psychiatry has advanced from Bedlam to modern mental
institutions, with a rising rate of cured and curable patients, is dramatic proof that it is neither mesmerism nor guess work. Psychiatric knowledge and techniques have found wide use in industry, education, social work, and family counseling. If such institutions can make use of this modern science, why cannot the law?
In Ahearn, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided to
deprive the trier of fact of information which is both relevant and
vital to the decision it must make. In reaching this decision, the
court has disclosed its undeniable distrust of psychiatry's ability
to contribute anything meaningful to the determination of the degree of the offense when a defendant pleads guilty to murder.
Whether or not this distrust is medically defensible is beyond the
scope of this article. It is, however, strikingly inconsistent with the
logical implications of several of the court's own prior decisions on
related questions of diminished responsibility. It is submitted that
a careful reappraisal of these cases would dictate a different result.
Regardless of what rules a court chooses to adopt when the sanity of a defendant is in issue, difficulties will always exist. No exact
and flawless measurements of human behavior are obtainable.
Psychiatrists will continue to have differences of opinion, and reasonable men will differ about the weight to be accorded psychiatric
testimony. Nevertheless, neither reason nor logic compels the conclusion that such testimony should be inadmissible when it is
offered to show a lack of deliberation and premeditation. It is
hoped that subsequent Pennsylvania decisions will repudiate
Ahearn and re-examine the policy and procedure involved in determining the responsibility of wrongdoers.
DAVID C. CLEAVER

